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Abstract. Quantum key distribution (QKD) is moving from research laboratories towards
applications. As computing becomes more mobile, cashless as well as cardless payment
solutions are introduced, and a need arises for incorporating QKD in a mobile device.
Handheld devices present a particular challenge as the orientation and the phase of a qubit
will depend on device motion. This problem is addressed by the reference frame independent
(RFI) QKD scheme. The scheme tolerates an unknown phase between logical states that
varies slowly compared to the rate of particle repetition. Here we experimentally demonstrate
the feasibility of RFI QKD over a free-space link in a prepare and measure scheme using
polarisation encoding. We extend the security analysis of the RFI QKD scheme to be able to
deal with uncalibrated devices and a finite number of measurements. Together these advances
are an important step towards mass production of handheld QKD devices.
Submitted to: New J. Phys.
ar
X
iv
:1
30
5.
01
58
v1
  [
qu
an
t-p
h]
  1
 M
ay
 20
13
Demonstration of Free-space Reference Frame Independent Quantum Key Distribution 2
1. Introduction
Quantum key distribution promises secure communications based not on the hardness of a
mathematical problem but on the laws of physics [1, 2, 3]. The main effort in the development
of QKD is directed towards long range communication, mostly fibre-based [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9] as
well as in free space [10, 11, 12, 13]. A prospective new application of QKD is in securing
short range line of sight communications between a terminal and a handheld device (see
Fig 1a) [14, 15]. Current mobile payment techniques, e.g. Near Field Communications,
have a range of security challenges including eavesdropping. Similar considerations apply
to securing Wi-Fi access points. We believe that future handheld QKD systems can address
these security challenges and provide a high degree of wireless security.
One of the unique problems faced by handheld QKD is the fact that the relative
orientation of the emitter and the receiver is variable. In previous works this problem has been
addressed by using entanglement [16] or by encoding information on angular momenta [17],
which are invariant under rotation. The Reference Frame Independent QKD scheme proposed
in [18] does not require entanglement and allows the use of polarisation encoding without the
need for alignment of the qubit reference frames. In this scheme the qubits are prepared and
measured in three mutually unbiased bases. Only one of those bases, on which the key is
encrypted, needs to be stable. The two other bases are allowed to drift slowly and are used to
estimate the security parameters of the quantum channels. The requirement for one basis to be
stable is met in most practical implementations. In the case of free-space polarisation-based
encoding, the stable basis is the circular polarisation, which is rotation independent. Fig 1b
shows the bases used by the emitter (Alice) XA, YA, ZA and the receiver (Bob) XB, YB, ZB for an
undetermined relative orientation. The use of additional bases compared to e.g. BB84 enables
the reference frame independence of the scheme.
In order to demonstrate the feasibility of such a protocol we implement a prepare and
measure scheme based on faint pulses and analyse the security of the channel. In addition to
the reference frame independence implied by the protocol, we develop a theoretical analysis
that allows us to take into account deviations from the ideal perpendicular preparation and
measurement bases. This is similar in spirit to device independent QKD (e.g. [19]). Although
we cannot claim to achieve full device independence, which generally requires entanglement,
we are able to deal with device imperfections and uncalibrated devices within our selected
model. In any QKD scheme the number of measurements available for the parameter
estimation step is finite. Parameters obtained from the measurements are estimates with a
non-zero variance, which impacts the secure key fraction as discussed in [20, 21, 22]. In
our security analysis we take this into account to derive a secret key fraction. In this article,
section 2 describes the experimental setup we used to implement a RFI protocol, while in
section 3 we analyse the security of the quantum channel including the influence of finite size
effects, imperfectly calibrated devices and mismatched detector efficiencies. In section 4 we
discuss our results.
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2. Experimental setup
In the prepare and measure RFI protocol, Alice needs to be able to randomly pick a light
polarisation state out of three different bases, i.e. horizontal/vertical, antidiagonal/diagonal,
left circular/right circular, corresponding to X, Y and Z basis. This is implemented by
activating one of six 850 nm VCSEL laser diodes. Their respective polarisations are separately
engineered before their optical beams are combined in a common mode. They are electrically
driven by a pattern generator with six individually controllable outputs. Each output generates
0.5 ns pulses and their amplitudes are adjusted so that the average photon number per pulse at
Alice’s output is the same for all the lasers. Random bit sequences allowing only one of the six
lasers to be active every 4 ns (i.e., 250×106 pulses per second) are programmed in the pattern
generator’s memory. Engineering of the polarisations is performed by a set of polarising
beam splitters (PBS), and waveplates (see Fig 2). At first the polarisation of the VCSELs
is ill-defined but it is filtered by the polarisation beam splitters with an extinction ratio of
about 13 dB. The outputs of the polarising beam splitters are polarised either horizontally
or vertically depending on which laser is active. One of the PBS output’s polarisation is left
unchanged. The output of another PBS passes through a 22.5◦ rotated λ/2 waveplate resulting
in diagonal/antidiagonal polarisations. The output of the last PBS is directed towards a 45◦
rotated λ/4 waveplate resulting in left/right circular polarisations. The waveplate used in this
a) 
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Figure 1: a) A mobile QKD terminal communicating with a stationary QKD terminal. The
mobile terminal is free to rotate. b) Poincaré sphere representation of Alice and Bob’s
reference frames. The Z basis (circular polarisation), represented by black vectors, is shared
by Alice and Bob and is used as the key basis. Alice’s X and Y bases (horizontal/vertical
and diagonal/antidiagonal), represented by red vectors, are aligned with the Poincaré sphere’s
axes. Bob’s X and Y bases, represented in blue, are rotated with respect to Alice’s. A rotation
of the terminal by the angle φ results in a rotation on the Poincaré sphere by 2φ .
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Figure 2: Experimental implementation of RFI QKD with the layout of the emitter (Alice’s
device) and the receiver (Bob’s device). On Alice’s side, unpolarised light is produced by six
laser diodes directed towards the two inputs of three polarising beam splitters. The outputs
of the polarising beam splitters are polarised either horizontally or vertically depending on
which laser is active. One of the outputs passes through a 22.5◦ rotated λ/2 waveplate
resulting in diagonal/antidiagonal polarisations. Another PBS output is directed towards a
45◦ rotated λ/4 waveplate resulting in left/right circular polarisations. The last polarising
beam splitter output’s polarisation is left unchanged. The three resulting beams are combined
with two non-polarising beam splitters. The spatial profile of the combined beams is filtered
with a 1mm pinhole, while the direction profiles are filtered with a 5µm pinhole between
two lenses. Finally, light passes through a spectral filter and a neutral density filter reducing
the intensity to single photon level. After the output of the emitter, a rotating λ/2 waveplate
is used to simulate a rotation between the emitter and the receiver. The optical arrangement
of the receiver is similar to the emitter except that optical fibres leading to the detectors are
mounted instead of the lasers. Both Alice and Bob’s device are mounted on a 10cm by 10cm
metal plate and the distance between the two is slightly above 1m. The compactness of our
assembly can be seen in the insets.
experiment are achromatic but we estimate their retardance at 850nm to be 0.535 and 0.265
(+/-0.05) for the half and quarter waveplates respectively. Those discrepancies together with
the PBS extinction ratio are responsible for the biasing of the bases that are discussed in the
theoretical section. After preparing the polarisations the three resulting beams are combined
with two non-polarising beam splitters. The spatial profile of the combined beams is filtered
with a 1mm pinhole, while the direction profiles are filtered with a 5µm pinhole between
two lenses. Finally, light passes through a neutral density filter reducing the intensity down to
below 0.05 photons per pulse. After the output of the emitter, a rotating λ/2 waveplate is used
to simulate a rotation between the emitter and the receiver. The photons then travel through
free space for slightly more than a meter to the measurement terminal. At the input of the
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measurement device, a spectral filter with 10 nm passband and 0.7 maximum transmission
is used to reduce background noise. The optical arrangement of the receiver is similar to
the emitter except that it is used in reverse. The common optical mode is divided in three
beams by the non-polarising beam splitters and waveplates are used before the PBSs to allow
measurements in the three bases. Thus, the measurement basis is passively selected by the
path of the photon, making it perfectly random. The six PBS outputs are coupled with
approximately 0.8 efficiency to multimode optical fibres leading to single photon detectors.
The photo detectors are silicon avalanche photodiodes with 0.45 efficiency at 850 nm, 400
dark counts per second, a timing resolution of 600 ps and 50 ns dead time. Their firing
times as well as a clock pulse coming from the pattern generator are continuously recorded
by a counting card. In post processing, we eliminate all the counts that happened when
another detector was still in its dead time, i.e. whenever two counts happen within 60 ns.
Bitrates could possibly be increased by using detection events in other detectors during a
given detector’s deadtime, but the implications on security are unexplored. The remaining
number of counts for a measurement duration of 1 s is approximately 2× 106 out of the
250× 106 weak pulses generated. The experiment is performed in the dark and owing to
spectral filtering background noise is negligible compared to detector dark counts.
Finally, by matching recorded detection times with the original random patterns we can
construct a 6 x 6 matrix (see Fig 3a) corresponding to the number of times one of the six
detectors fired when one of the six lasers was active. The number of counts is maximal if
the emitting and receiving polarisations are the same, it is minimal if they are opposite and it
is approximately half of the maximum for all the other polarisations. This matrix constitutes
the raw data of the security analysis. The counts in this matrix will be used for two different
purposes. Half of the counts when both the sending and the measurement basis were Z are set
aside as the raw key. The remaining half with all other counts forms the basis of the parameter
estimation. The raw key length for each 1 s interval is approximately 2× 105. In order to
demonstrate the robustness of our QKD scheme against reference frame rotations, we insert a
half wave plate on a rotating mount in the free space optical path between the two terminals.
Varying the optic axis angle of the half wave plate simulates rotations of Alice’s device. For
each angle, a measurement is taken similar to that presented in Fig 3a. A comparison between
measurement data and the 6 x 6 matrix predicted for ideal preparation and detection is shown
in Fig 3b. The matching detector count patterns in Fig 3b already suggest that a quantum
channel between the terminals is established, but in order to claim the possibility of quantum
key distribution we need to analyse the results more rigorously.
3. Secure Key Fraction
The security of the RFI QKD protocol is discussed in [18]: Two parameters are estimated
from the measurements: the quantum bit error rate Q and a rotation invariant quantity C (see
Appendix B). While this analysis gives a good intuition why the scheme is reference frame
independent, it does not take into account factors that can impact the key rate negatively in
a real world setting, such as non-orthogonality of the measurement directions or finite size
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Figure 3: Results of the normalised detector count matrix for the implemented reference frame
independent quantum key distribution protocol. Each matrix square represents the number of
counts on the specified detector, when the specified polarisation was prepared. a) With the
two reference frames aligned, corresponding preparation and measurement bases are almost
completely correlated, with measurements between mutually unbiased bases showing almost
no correlation. This indicates almost perfect transmission through the quantum channel. b)
Comparison of ideal (I) and measured data (M) for six further reference frames, with angle
of misalignment shown. While the counts contributing to the correlator CZZ remain largely
independent of the rotation angle, others contribute a periodic dependence to correlatorsCXX ,
CXY , CYX and CYY . Counts contributing to the non-zero correlators CXZ , CYZ , CZX and CZY
indicate that the X, Y and Z directions are not perpendicular.
effects. In this section we derive the secure key fraction in the qubit subspace based on a
model of the device including imperfect calibration of preparation and measurement bases,
non uniform detector efficiencies and also the effect of a finite number of measurements.
In general the calculation of the secret key fraction can be posed as an inference problem:
given the measurements and a device model what is the maximum amount of information an
eavesdropper can possess about the distributed key? We first introduce a simplified expression
for the secure key fraction, then consider a model of our QKD system and minimise the secure
key fraction subject to constraints derived from the model and the measurements.
The secure key fraction can be reduced from the ideal 100% due to leakage of
information at two stages in the protocol [23]. During the quantum stage information can leak
to an eavesdropper, while during error correction a certain minimum amount of information
needs to be exchanged over a classical channel. The two terms of the following expression
[24] for the secret key fraction reflect the impact of those two information leaks
r = S(χA|ρE)−H(χA|χB), (1)
where S(·|·) denotes the conditional von Neumann entropy, H(·|·) the conditional Shannon
entropy, χA are the classical bit values at terminal A, χB are the classical bit values at terminal
B and ρE denotes the density matrix of the eavesdropper. The first term describes the entropy
of the key bits χA given the eavesdropper’s information, we will call this “usable entropy”,
SU . The second term is the minimum necessary information to successfully perform error
correction at the Shannon limit. In any real world implementation this number has to be
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multiplied by a factor larger than one to account for non-ideal error correction schemes.
The main objective of the parameter estimation step is to find the minimum usable entropy
given the constraints set by the measurements. These constraints also take into account the
uncertainties associated with a finite number of performed measurements. Additionally the
parameter estimation step provides information about the bit error rate, which is needed for
error correction and thus an estimate for the second term. In our analysis we assume that the
measurement results are produced by a two qubit density matrix ρAB shared between parties
A and B. The usable entropy can be expressed as (see Appendix C)
SU = S (ρAB||PρAB) , (2)
where S (A||B) denotes the relative entropy and the super-operator Pρ = PA0 ρPA0 +PA1 ρPA1
with the projector on the bit values at terminal A defined as PA0/1 =
1
2
(
1±σAz
)
. To estimate
the usable entropy we have to establish a model for our quantum key distribution system.
This consists of a model of the quantum channel, embodied in the density matrix, along with
a model of the terminal devices. The secret key fraction can be obtained as the minimum over
all channel and device parameters that are consistent with the performed measurements. For
a finite number of measurements the constraints will possess a statistical uncertainty that has
to be taken into account in the minimisation procedure. As we are looking for an upper bound
for the usable entropy it suffices to consider a simplified density matrix (see Appendix D),
guaranteed to give a lower usable entropy than the full density matrix. The usable entropy for
this density matrix becomes
SU(λ1,λ2) = 1+∑
i
ηi log2ηi−h(2η1) , (3)
with the eigenvalues of the density matrix η1 = η2 = 1/4(1−λ1), η3 = 1/4(1+λ1−2λ2) and
η4 = 1/4(1+λ1+2λ2) and h(x) =−x log2 x− (1− x) log2(1− x). With perfectly calibrated
and aligned devices no additional model parameters have to be taken into account. Imperfect
measurement devices can lead to a large number of additional parameters, such as non-
orthogonalities in the preparation and measurement bases and detector efficiencies, which
can be collected into the vector α (for the details of the model see Appendix E). The usable
entropy is obtained as the minimum over all parameters α , λ1/2
Smin = min
α,λ1,λ2
SU(λ1,λ2). (4)
The parameters have to obey the constraints imposed by the observations
fi(m)−σδ fi(m)≤ fi [q(α,λ1,λ2)]≤ fi(m)+σδ fi(m), (5)
where m is a matrix containing all relevant detector counts, q is the corresponding probability
of observing a detector count according to the device model (see Appendix E), the fi are
the functions defining the different constraints, the δ fi are their corresponding variances and
σ is chosen to give a certain probability that the estimated usable entropy is too high. In
our parameter estimation step we use a set of 21 constraints (see Appendix F) consisting of
9 correlation functions CAB, A,B = X ,Y,Z, the six probabilities that a photon was prepared
in a certain polarisation direction PA±, A = X ,Y,Z and the six probabilities to detect in a
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certain detector DB±, B= X ,Y,Z. For each function fi we can give the standard deviation δ fi
(see Appendix F). To obtain the secret key fraction we need to subtract the observed relative
entropy in the key basis from the usable entropy
r = Smin−h
(
1−CZZ+σδCZZ
2
)
. (6)
The full set of measurements enables us to calculate a reference frame independent key rate.
From the detector counts we can construct 9 correlation functions
CAB =
mAB+++m
AB−−−mAB+−−mAB−+
mAB+++mAB−−+mAB+−+mAB−+
, A,B= X ,Y,Z, (7)
where the mAB±± are the four different detector counts given that the qubit was prepared in
direction A± and detected in direction B±. In the case of orthonormal preparation and
measurement bases these can be directly identified with the qubit correlation functions.
A secret key fraction can be obtained as the minimum key rate over all density matrices
consistent with the observed correlators. In the BB84 protocol [25, 24] only two correlators,
e.g. CXX and CZZ , are used as constraints. When the reference frames are rotated CXX will
drop and so will the secret key fraction. The RFI QKD scheme uses the four correlators CXX ,
CXY ,CYX ,CYY as well asCZZ . While each individual correlator may decrease under reference
frame rotations, the combinationC=C2XX+C
2
XY +C
2
YX+C
2
YY ideally stays constant, enabling
reference frame independent secret key fractions. In order to treat imperfect preparation and
measurement we have to depart from the assumption of orthonormal bases and include a more
detailed detector model. Each preparation and each detector are associated with a direction
on the Poincaré sphere, given by a unit vector. Since we aim to use the z-basis for the key
bits we can identify two preparation directions with the ±z direction on the Poincaré sphere,
without overestimating the secret key fraction. Each direction is parametrised by two variables
(e.g. azimuth and polar angle), resulting in a total of 20 free parameters (see Appendix E).
Different absorption may occur in the preparation channels, and similarly detectors may have
different efficiencies. With six possible preparation directions and six possible detection
direction this adds another set of 12 parameters. The quantum channel can be represented
by a two parameter two qubit density matrix in a simplification over the more commonly
employed Bell diagonal density matrix (see Appendix D). This results in a model with 34
free parameters. The secret key fraction is then obtained as the minimum over all parameters
that fulfil the constraints imposed by the measurements, e.g. from the correlators CAB; in
our case a set of 21 constraints. For the number of detector counts approaching infinity the
constraints are equalities, but for a finite number of observations the value can lie within an
interval determined by the number of counts and the desired uncertainty. A small number of
counts will lead to larger uncertainty in the correlation function and therefore to lower results
for the secret key fraction.
4. Results and Discussion
Our main result is that the secret key fraction remains above 0.2 for all rotation angles even in
the presence of device imperfections, see U-RFI in Fig 4. To better understand the calculated
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Figure 4: Keyrates as a function of the physical waveplate rotation angle for two
reference frame independent and 4 different BB84 protocols. U-RFI labels the reference
frame independent keyrate assuming uncalibrated devices. It is obtained from numerical
minimisation over the full set of model parameters subject to constraints imposed by the
measurements. The blue dots correspond to the minimised key rate neglecting the variance
coming from the finite number of measurements. The blue bars indicate the result obtained
by allowing for an uncertainty in the estimate of the constraints of three times the standard
deviation. The remaining curves are obtained from the same data but with a simplified model,
assuming orthogonality within bases and total perpendicularity between bases. RFI labels the
keyrate for the reference frame independent protocol as outlined in [18]. XX, XY, YX and YY
label the keyrates for the BB84 protocol using the respective correlator pairs CZZ and CXX ,
CZZ and CXY , and so on.
keyrate we make a comparison with established protocols: the BB84 protocol and the RFI
QKD protocol as proposed by Laing, Scarani, Rarity and O’Brien [18]. For the sake of
comparison we assume that in these protocols both preparation bases and measurement bases
are perfect, i.e. the measured correlation functions are indeed the qubit correlation functions
of the underlying density matrix. A summary of the calculation of the BB84 and RFI QKD key
rates can be found in Appendix A and Appendix B. We clearly see in Fig 4 that while the BB84
key rate drops to zero for certain angles the RFI QKD key rate remains non-zero for all rotation
angles. The plot also shows that for certain angles the RFI secret key fraction estimate is too
optimistic compared to the U-RFI rates. This happens due to non-orthogonal measurement
directions, which are not taken into account in the RFI QKD security analysis. The distinct
peaks in the secret key fraction coincide with the peaks visible in the secret key fraction
calculated for the BB84 protocols, as outlined above. This can be understood in the following
way: The secret key fraction we calculate depends on the correlators CAB, A,B= X ,Y,Z. The
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correlatorCZZ is linked to the qubit error rate. The correlatorsCXX ,CXY ,CYX ,CYY are related
to monitoring the eavesdropping. If the absolute value of one of these correlators is large then
eavesdropping in the key basis is small, even if other correlators are relatively small. This
also makes the secret key fraction larger then the RFI keyrate for some angles. In the region
between the peaks no individual correlator is large and only their combination gives a positive
secret key fraction. In the presence of alignment errors some of the contributing correlators
may be small and as a result the secret key fraction drops.
During each transmission of one second we set aside approximately 2× 105 raw key
bits. After obtaining the correct secret key fraction from the parameter estimation step we can
perform the privacy amplification step by applying the appropriate 2-universal hash function
(e.g. a Toeplitz matrix [26]) to the raw key and obtain a secure key. With a secret key
fraction of around 0.25 we arrive at an approximate key rate of 5× 104 s−1. In the current
implementation of our scheme potential security loop holes exist due to side channels [27],
the most obvious one coming from the use of six different lasers in the preparation stage.
While this loophole can be plugged by using a single laser and a 1 x 6 optical switch further
analysis of the impact of side channels on the key rate is required (e.g. the effect of photon
number statistics [28] or detector characteristics [29] on our scheme).
Nevertheless we are able to give an estimate of the impact of photon number statistics
on the key rate in our scheme. Without employing decoy states we have to assume that in
pulses which contain more than one photon and which are contributing to the raw key all
information is lost to the eavesdropper. Our photon source generates weak coherent pulses
with a rate of 250MHz and an average photon number of 0.05 per pulse. In order to assess the
impact of a hypothetical photon number splitting attack we have to characterise the quantum
channel. An important quantity is the accessible loss [30] in the quantum channel, i.e. the part
of the loss that is, in principle, under the control of the eavesdropper. Due to the short range
free space transmission no absorption occurs between Alice and Bob. A small amount of
absorption (coupling efficiency≈ 0.8) can be attributed to the mode mismatch between sender
and receiver and could be manipulated by an eavesdropper. All other losses occur in the Bob
device and are inaccessible losses. Starting from a 250MHz pulse rate and 0.05 photons per
pulse we arrive at a raw single photon rate of 12.5MHz. The recorded photon count rate is
2MHz, giving a total absorption of η=0.16. The accessible part of the absorption is ηA = 0.8,
while the inaccessible part, containing absorption in filters, losses in optical components and
finite detector efficiency contributes ηI = 0.2, so that η = ηAηI . The rate of two photon
pulses according to Poisson statistics is 0.3MHz. The remaining single photons after a photon
number splitting attack will still experience the inaccessible losses, so that the total number of
recorded detector clicks associated with two photon pulses is 60kHz. Of these photons only
a fraction contributes to the raw key. For our setup that fraction is 0.1. For a key distribution
lasting one second we estimate that an eavesdropper can at most have information about 6000
key bits out of 2×105 key bits, or the secure key fraction has to be reduced by approximately
0.03, due to the probabilistic nature of the photon source, only slightly modifying our secret
key fraction.
In summary, we have shown the feasibility of reference frame independent key
Demonstration of Free-space Reference Frame Independent Quantum Key Distribution 11
distribution using off the shelf bulk optical components in a compact assembly. Our setup uses
passive components and can readily be transferred to a miniaturised version using integrated
optics on a chip [31, 32]. Our analysis employed in the parameter estimation step obviates the
need for precise alignment of the preparation and measurement qubit bases. The achievable
key rates are sufficient to distribute hundreds of 256 bit keys within 1 second. In order to
realise a handheld QKD device additional functionality, like steering of the emitted photons
towards a receiver needs to be implemented. Possible solutions include movable mirrors,
movable lenses or phased arrays. Overall, the work presented here paves the way for mass-
produced handheld QKD devices.
Appendix A. Keyrate for BB84
For the calculation of the keyrate for the BB84 protocol we follow [24], with the difference
that we use two parameters for the quantum channel, the correlation functions CXX and CZZ .
The secure key fraction for the BB84 protocol is given by
r = min
ηi
(
1+
4
∑
i=1
ηi log2ηi
)
(A.1)
under the constraints
CXX = 1−2η2−2η4 (A.2)
CZZ = 1−2η3−2η4 (A.3)
4
∑
i=1
ηi = 1. (A.4)
This can be solved analytically to give
r= 1+z+x+ log2 (z+x+)+z+x− log2 (z+x−)+z−x+ log2 (z−x+)+z−x− log2 (z−x−) (A.5)
with
x± =
1±CXX
2
, z± =
1±CZZ
2
(A.6)
Alternatively other correlators than CXX can be used to obtain a keyrate. In the case of
misaligned reference frames the correlators CXY or CYX may give a more favourable keyrate.
Appendix B. RFI QKD
Reference frame independent quantum key distribution was introduced in [18]. The scheme
solves the problem of aligning reference frames between two partners in a quantum key
distribution protocol if one stable direction exists (e.g. in polarisation encoding physical
rotation does not influence the circular polarisation direction). The stable direction is used
for encoding the qubits, while perpendicular directions are used for parameter estimation. It
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is sufficient to consider two quantities constructed from the qubit correlation functions: the
bit error rate
Q=
1−CZZ
2
(B.1)
and the quantity
C =C2XX +C
2
XY +C
2
YX +C
2
YY . (B.2)
with the qubit correlation functions given by
CAB = Tr(σAσBρ) , (B.3)
where ρ is the two qubit density matrix. Under rotations around the z axis the Pauli matrices
transform σx→ σx cosα+σy sinα and σy→ σy cosα−σx sinα , with the rotation angle given
by α . One can see that the quantityC stays invariant under these kind of rotations. The secret
key fraction can be shown to be a function of C and Q. For Q. 0.159 the secret key fraction
becomes
r = 1−h(Q)− (1−Q)h
(
1+u
2
)
−Qh
(
1+ v
2
)
(B.4)
with h(x) = − log2 x − (1 − x) log2(1 − x) the Shannon entropy function and u =
min(
√
C/2/(1−Q),1) and v=
√
C/2− (1−Q)2u2/Q.
Appendix C. Conditional Entropy decreases under Projective Measurement
A quantum communication channel between parties Alice (A) and Bob (B) can be described
by the density matrix ρAB. In general this density matrix will not be pure due to noise, errors
and the action of an eavesdropper. In order to prove security of the communication channel we
have to assume all deviations from the ideal case are due to an eavesdropper. The combined
state of ρAB and an eavesdropper can then be expressed as the pure state
|ψ >ABE=
4
∑
i=1
√
λi|Φi >AB |νi >E , (C.1)
where the λi are the eigenvalues of ρAB, |Φi >AB are the corresponding eigenfunctions and
|νi > are an orthogonal basis for the state of the eavesdropper. Note that the dimension of the
Hilbert space of the eavesdropper equals the dimensions of ρAB. The density matrices in the
subspaces can then be obtained as
ρAB = TrE (|ψ >ABE< ψ|ABE) (C.2)
and
ρE = TrAB (|ψ >ABE< ψ|ABE) . (C.3)
The reduced density matrix of the eavesdropper equals the reduced density matrix of Alice
and Bob up to a unitary transformation
ρE =UρABU†. (C.4)
Demonstration of Free-space Reference Frame Independent Quantum Key Distribution 13
Let us consider the entropy of the key bits χA given that the eavesdropper knows the state of
the system χE , S(χA|χE). We can rewrite the conditional entropy as
S(χA|ρE) = S(χA)+S(χE |χA)−S(ρE). (C.5)
With X being the classical value of Alice’s qubit we can write
S(ρE |χA) = ∑
x=0,1
pxS(Ex) (C.6)
If Alice prepares key bit 0 with probability p0 and key bit one with probability p1 we can
write the corresponding density matrices E0, E1 with the help of the projection operators
Px = |x>A< x|A, x= 0,1 (C.7)
as
Ex = TrAB (Px|ψ >ABE< ψ|ABE) (C.8)
or
Ex =
1
px
√
ρABPx
√
ρAB. (C.9)
Since unitary transformations do not change the entropy we can replace ρAB with ρE in the
calculation of entropies
S
(
1
px
√
ρABPx
√
ρAB
)
= S
(
1
px
√
ρEPx
√
ρE
)
. (C.10)
We can use
Tr [
√
ρP
√
ρF(
√
ρP
√
ρ)] = Tr [PρPF(PρP)] , (C.11)
where F is any function and we used
F(
√
ρP
√
ρ) =∑
n
cn(
√
ρP
√
ρ) =∑
n
√
ρP(PρP)n−1P
√
ρ. (C.12)
We can therefore write
S(ρE |χA) = ∑
x=0,1
pxS(
1
px
PxρEPx). (C.13)
Since the Px project onto orthogonal subspaces we can use (see Nielsen and Chuang, p.518
[33]) to write
S(ρE |χA) = S
(
∑
x=0,1
PxρEPx
)
−S(χA). (C.14)
The equality holds if the projectors Px project onto orthogonal subspaces and acts as an upper
bound on the usable entropy otherwise. The conditional entropy therefore becomes
S(χA|ρE) = S
(
∑
x=0,1
PxρEPx
)
−S(χE). (C.15)
Introducing the projective measurement
Pρ =∑
x
PxρPx (C.16)
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we can write
S(χA|ρE) = S (PρE)−S(ρE). (C.17)
SinceP is a projective measurement this simplifies further to the relative entropy
S(χA|ρE) = S (ρE ||PρE) = S (ρAB||PρAB) . (C.18)
We now want to investigate how a further projective measurement influences the relative
entropy. Introducing
L ρ =∑
i
LiρLi, (C.19)
with the projection operators Li. We consider the relative entropy before and after the
projective measurementL
S (ρAB||PρAB)−S (L ρAB||PL ρAB) . (C.20)
For commuting operations
PL =LP (C.21)
and using that the relative entropy of two density matrices decreases or stays the same under
completely positive trace preserving maps [34] we obtain
S (ρAB||PρAB)−S (L ρAB||LPρAB)≥ 0 (C.22)
if the operationsL andP commute.
Appendix D. Simplified density matrices for parameter estimation
We can use the inequality above to simplify the model density matrix for parameter estimation.
Starting from the full two qubit density matrix with 15 free parameters we can apply a series
of projective measurements,
L =L2L1 (D.1)
to arrive at a simpler density matrix with fewer parameters that is guaranteed to give a smaller
value for the usable entropy. The individual projective measurement super-operators are
Li = lim
t→∞e
−tKi (D.2)
and the corresponding Liouvillian
Kiρ = {ΣiΣi,ρ}−2ΣiρΣi, Σ1 = σAz −σBz ,Σ2 = σAx σBx . (D.3)
If we use the z basis for the key bits then the measurement operator becomes
Pρ = PA0 ρP
A
0 +P
A
1 ρP
A
1 (D.4)
with the projector on the bit values at terminal A defined as
PA0/1 =
1
2
(
1±σAz
)
(D.5)
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It can be shown that
PLiρ−LiPρ = 0 (D.6)
for all density matrices ρ . After applying all the projective measurements to a general density
matrix the simplified density matrix takes the form
ρ =
1
4

1+λ1 0 0 2λ2
0 1−λ1 0 0
0 0 1−λ1 0
2λ2 0 0 1+λ1
 (D.7)
This density matrix can now be used in models for parameter estimation.
Appendix E. Device model
We want to construct a model for the probability of registering a detector count in the detector
measuring in basis B, direction V , provided the bit was prepared in basis A, direction U , pABUV .
The probability of observing a count in a detector given a certain preparation is proportional
to
qABUV = t
1
AU t
2
BVTr
(
PˆAU PˆBVρ
)
, (E.1)
where t1 and t2 account for the preparation and detection efficiencies. The projectors PˆAU , PˆBV
are along a certain preparation or measurement direction, given by a unit vector nAX or rBY
PˆAU =
1
2
(1+nAU ·σA) , PˆBV = 12 (1+ rBV ·σB) , (E.2)
where σA/B is a vector of Pauli matrices in the respective local basis. Using the simplified
density matrix Eq. (D.7) we obtain
qABUV =
t1AU t
2
BV
4
[
1+∑
i j
nAUi r
BV
j Tr
(
σˆAi σˆ
B
j ρ
)]
(E.3)
with
Tr
(
σˆAi σˆ
B
j ρ
)
= δi jli = Λi j, l = (λ2,λ2,λ1) (E.4)
and therefore
qABUV =
t1AU t
2
BV
4
(1+nAU ·Λ · rBV ) . (E.5)
so that the probabilities become
pABUV =
qABUV
∑ABUV qABUV
. (E.6)
For our measurement setup there are six distinct preparation directions nAU , A =
X , Y, Z, U = ±, with two free parameters, the azimuthal and polar angle, specifying
each direction. The z-direction is identified with the qubit directions at terminal A and
therefore we fix nZ± = (0,0,±1). Similarly there are six measurement directions rBV , B=
X , Y, Z, V =±.
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Appendix F. Detector counts and correlation functions
The calculation of the secret key fraction is based on a minimisation subject to a number of
constraints. In our implementation we use a total of 21 constraints. Each constraint and its
corresponding standard deviation can be calculated from the raw detector counts obtained in
the parameter estimation process. The first set of constraints is given by the 9 correlation
functions
CAB(m) =
mAB+++m
AB−−−mAB+−−mAB−+
mAB+++mAB−−+mAB+−+mAB−+
, A,B= X ,Y,Z (F.1)
Additional 6 constraints are the probabilities for preparing a certain direction
PAU(m) =
∑BV mABUV
N0
, N0 = ∑
ABUV
mABUV , (F.2)
where N0 is the total number of detector counts. Further 6 constraints are the probabilities for
detecting a certain direction
DBV (m) =
∑AU mABUV
N0
. (F.3)
The corresponding standard deviations are
δCAB(m) =
√√√√4(mAB+++mAB−−)(mAB+−+mAB−+)(
mAB+++mAB−−+mAB+−+mAB−+
)3 . (F.4)
and
δPAU(m) =
√
(N0−∑BV mABUV )∑BV mABUV
N30
, (F.5)
as well as
δDBV (m) =
√
(N0−∑AU mABUV )∑AU mABUV
N30
. (F.6)
This gives us a total of 21 constraints derived from the raw detector counts to be used in the
calculation of the secret key fraction.
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